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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action seeking recission of a contract of sale
of a Condor Motor Home.

Plaintiffs are buyers, defendant-appellant

Larson Ford Sales, Inc. is the retail seller, Ford Marketing
Corporation is the manufacturer, and Condor Coach Corporation is
the assembler and manufacturer.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury, verdict and judgment for
the plaintiff.

Defendant Larson Ford Sales, Inc. appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant Larson Ford Sales, Inc. seeks the reversal of
the trial court judgment and entry of judgment of no cause of
action, or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff cannot accept as a complete and accurate
statement of the material facts those set forth in defendantappellant! s brief.

The facts he believes are supported by the

evidence favorable to the verdict of the jury are as follows:
On or about the 9th of May, 1972, plaintiff and his son,
Robin Christopher, visited the Larson Ford Sales, Inc. lot in
Murray, Utah and became interested in purchasing a Condor Coach
which was exhibited for sale by Larson.
Their discussions were with Jon P. Larson, who signs
himself as Vice President of Larson Ford Sales, Inc.

Christopher

advised Larson that the vehicle which was to be purchased was
for the use of his son Robin in taking children from the American
Fork Training School on a trip to sell merchandise.

It would be

necessary that the vehicle pull an Econovan which would be
required after the boys and Robin arrived at the cities where
sales were to be solicited (R. 397).
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Larson represented at that time that the Condor Motor
Home that they were looking at had sufficient power to carry the
ten boys and pull the Econovan and that a person with such a
Condor pulled a big horse trailer with four horses in it with no
problem (R. 397).
After preliminary examination, the Christophers came to
the conclusion that the vehicle was the kind that they needed,
and on the 13th of May a downpayment of $1,500.00 was given on
the motor home.

Again discussion occurred about the ability of

the Condor to pull the car and haul the boys and Larson assured
them that that would be no problem (R. 400). Financing was
arranged through Larson Ford for the purchase price of the vehicle,
money to be advanced by Murray First Thrift and Loan (R. 24,
Exhibit 8-P).
The vehicle was not in operable condition at the time of
the downpayment and was not operated until the final payment on
the purchase price of $975.00 (R. 403). On the 19th of May the
plaintiff and his son Robin hooked the Econovan on to the Condor
and drove it up Parleys Canyon for a test drive (R. 406). They
noticed that the vehicle slowed down excessively and that they
came to the conclusion that it was not sufficiently powered to
handle the Econovan and carry the ten boys that it was being
purchased to carry.
20th of May.

Plaintiff returned to Larson Ford on the

He discussed with Jon Larson the fact that the

machine seemed to be gutless and that there was a howling in the
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rear end and the brakes were defective.

In response to this

information, Jon Larson said to the plaintiff, !lThe brakes we can
fix it right now.

The howl because it is heavy duty commercial

transmission, the transmission and the motor is all heavy duty
commercial and they will all do it." They argued some, and then
Jon Larson said, "Goddam it, man, give us a chance.
all winter.

It set there

Let me take it in. We will tune it, then take it to

the west coast or wherever you are going with it, and then if
you have got a complaint, bring it back." (R. 409). At that
time all but the final payment of $975.00 had been paid by
Christopher on the purchase price of the motor home.

Robin's

version of the conversation is at page 514 of the record.
Neither of the statements by Robin Christopher or John
Christopher are contradicted by any testimony.

The testimony is

corroborated by Jon Larson (page 734 of the record).

He mentions

the discussion of the howl in the transmission and that he told
the Christophers this was normal and that thwn they returned to
the dealership any problems would be taken care of.
The Condor was then taken and driven by Robin Christopher
to California and through the Northwest.

During this trip the

defects appeared in the vehicle which rendered it unfit for the
Christophers' purpose.
There were no warranty documents available for delivery
to Christophers at the completion of the sale.

Jon Larson wrote

out on Larson Ford Sales stationery Exhibit 3-P.

The language of

f

3-P that is important is flthis unit is fully covered under Ford
service warranty at time of delivery.'1

And, "we will guarantee

his service policy as valid and in effect", and is signed Jon P.
Larson, V. Pres.
Larsons were kept informed of the problems as they arose
on the Northwest trip.
Immediately upon getting the vehicle back to Salt Lake
City, Christopher requested that the sale be rescinded.

This

remedy was refused by Larson Ford.
Christopher was unable to get the vehicle back to Salt
Lake without having it serviced at Reno, Nevada by a Ford agency.
Exhibit 6-P reveals the rear end was repaired, the starter motor
and relay replaced, and Christopher advised concerning the defective
condition of the vehicle (R. 424).
Plaintiff produced an expert witness, Haslam, who had 26
years of mechanic experience, worked on buses for Lewis Bros.
Stages, was employed as a mechanic working on buses, trucks and
cars for Granite School District where he was still employed.
He testified that he discovered the following defects in
the Condor:

(1) The starter solenoid was mounted on the chassis

so close to the exhaust manifold that it got hot, which caused it
to malfunction (R. 609). (2) The generator at the fuel pump was
crossthreaded and sucked air instead of fuel (R. 611). (3) The
fuel line to the generator was put in so that it only picked up
when the tank was above half full and would operate only out of
the top half of the tank (R. 613). (4) The engine was mounted

on the chassis in a manner that restricted the air supply, and
it was Haslam's opinion that the air supply was not adequate to
permit the engine to operate properly (R. 621). (5) There was a
howl in the rear end in the differential (R. 623) and the howl
sounded like a mismatch between the green gear and pinion, that
the transmission, drive line and differential were too small to
handle the motor home (R. 624) .
On June 3 plaintiff talked to Jon Larson about the troubles
that Robin Christopher had had with the motor home.

He was told

the fact that the motor home would not go over grades at a
reasonable speed, and the starting problem.

He told Jon that

they would have to bring the machine back, that it was a lemon
and wouldn't do the job for them (R. 415). Jon Larson replied,
lf

I am only the Vice President.

I can't make the decisions and

Park, my brother, is out of town, and I will certainly take it
up and see what we can do." (R. 416) .
On the 23rd of June a conversation occurred between
plaintiff and the sales manager of Larson Ford.

Christopher was

instructed to bring the machine back to Salt Lake City (R. 418).
The motor home was in the Ford outlet at Reno, Nevada for repairs.
Christopher drove the motor home from Reno to Salt Lake
and experienced the same general problems that had been reported.
As soon as the vehicle was in Salt Lake, it was delivered to the
witness Haslam's home (R. 426). The next morning Christopher
discussed the matter with Jon Larson (R. 428), advised him that

I
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he wanted to bring the motor home back as it was not satisfactory.
Jon Larson replied, "You have bought yourself a new machine and
I won't discuss it with you."

(R. 429).

A great deal of testimony was produced by all parties to
the legal action.

The court instructed the jury and submitted

the matter to the jury on two basic propositions—fraud and breach
of warranty.

As to the fraud which would justify rescission of

the sale by the buyer, two basic propositions were submitted,
whether or not the seller knew that the representations he made
were false or made them recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such a representation.

Jon Larson

had never used the coach and had no information on its ability to
do the jobs required.
Court also submitted the matter to the jury on the basis
of whether or not the plaintiff could rescind as a result of
breach of warranty on the basis that the motor vehicle to be
merchantable must be at least such as was fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used.

It is noted that the

appellant does not take issue with any of the court's instructions
and it appeared that the instructions were free from substantial
error on which reversal of the case could be predicated.
Appellant made its complaint over against Condor Coach
Corporation based on a warranty theory.

Plaintiff submits this

amounts to an acceptance as true the claims of breach of warranty
by plaintiff.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
BREACH OF WARRANTY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
The evidence clearly established without contradiction
that the Condor Coach was so defect ive that it was not useable
for the ordinary purposes for which such vehicles are used and
was therefore not merchantable.
U.C.A. 70A-2-314, entitled "Implied warranty Merchantability - Usage of trade11, in subsection 2(c), defines
merchantability as:

"Goods to be merchantable must be at least

such as (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used;".
In addition to the foregoing section of the Utah Code,
plaintiff claimed that the appellant breached U.C.A. 70A-2-315,
entitled "Implied warranty - Fitness for particular purpose".
This section covers the situation where the buyer makes known
to the seller a particular purpose for which the goods are to be
used and required.

l>

The evidence clearly shows that the vehicle would not
operate at a reasonable speed, could not be started after it was
warmed up and had been driven far enough to heat up the solenoid,
that it was underpowered, and that its differential and drive
train were inadequate.

This evidence shows the violation of both

sections of the Utah Code Annotated.
Utah law concerning the type of breach of warranty claimed
by plaintiff has been clear for many, many years.

In 1917 this

court decided Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, et al,
50 Utah 319^ 167 Pac. 663.

The case involved a situation very

similar to the present case and contained both a breach of implied
warranty of merchantability and a breach of warranty for specific
use.
Buyer, in the Studebaker case, purchased a used vehicle
for the purpose of carrying passengers to the New Grand Hotel
and to the railroad depot, The vehicle proved to be inadequate.
It was conceded that it was defective.

Seller attempted to make

the vehicle run, but could not do so.
Buyer had advised seller that he knew nothing of vehicles
and related the kind of work that had to do with the vehicle.
This court held that under the circumstances there was a breach
of warranty and that the seller was liable under an express
warranty, having represented that the vehicle was reasonably fit
for the purpose it had been advised the buyer needed to have
satisfied.

The remedy available was rescission, the remedy which

respondent-buyer here seeks.
In the case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah
161, 253 Pac. 196, the court reaffirmed its prior holding and
added that where a vendee has been induced to purchase by deceit,
he has his choice of remedies upon the discovery of the fraud.
He may affirm the contract and sue for damages, or he may rescind
it and sue for his price,
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A modern and current holding of the court decided in 1971
is Vernon v. Lake Motor, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488 P. 2d 302. The
Vernon case is important to plaintiff's position as it points out
that the conduct of the parties is important in warranty actions.
At page 275 the court stated:
M

The warranty should be given effect, not in any
unduly precise or technical interpretation, but
in accordance with what the ordinary purchaser
would understand from its language; and if there
is any uncertainty therein as to how it should
apply, the conduct of the parties in performing
under it may be looked to to determine its meaning."

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence and the law
fully support the action of the trial court and the jury verdict.
POINT II
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED AT THE TRIAL JUSTIFYING REVERSAL.
The trial court carefully prepared instructions submitting
the issues to be determined by the jury on two basic theories.
First, on the basis of fraud, and second, on breach of implied
warranty of merchantability.
It, in instruction No. 9, clearly laid the groundwork for
the instructions that followed relating to the basic requirements
to be met by the plaintiff in order to succeed.

Instruction No.

10 (R. 150) set down the various requirements as to the evidence
to be submitted in a fraud case.

Instruction No. 11 (R. 152) set

down the various elements that plaintiff was required to prove.
Appellant does not claim that there was not a careful,
correct and error-free set of instructions given to the jury, but

does claim that the evidence does not rise to the necessary
proof for submission to the jury.
The evidence is clear, uncontradicted and, respondent
submits, convincing.
Jon Larson, the source of representations to the plaintiff,
knew nothing about the actual operating capacity of the Condor
Coach which he was selling.

His knowledge and experience being

limited to those generally in the same line of manufactured goods.
However, he represented that this particular coach would do the
job that plaintiff needed done.

Even when closely questioned

about whether or not it would, he induced plaintiff to go forward
by representing that the defects were due to a winter's lack of
use and by promising the vehicle could be returned if it proved
inadequate on the trip to the Northwest contemplated by purchasers.
Larson supplied the handwritten warranty, Exhibit #3, to facilitate
servicing of the vehicle and set forth that it had a new vehicle
warranty by the Ford Motor Company.
None of the evidence relating to the representations nor
their falsity were seriously contraverted by sworn testimony.
In the position taken by appellant, i.e. that Condor Coach breached
its warranty, it admitted the vehicle's inadequacy and admitted
that it had induced the purchaser to try it out and see if it
would not do the job which purchaser needed accomplished.
Plaintiff submits that this evidence is clear, convincing,
and, as a matter of fact, undisputed and would justify the jury's
finding in his favor under the fraud theory.

_i i _

POINT III
MERCHANTABILITY WAS CLEARLY DEFINED BY THE COURT.
The court also submitted the matter to the jury under the
breach of warranty of merchantability.

Instruction No. 12 (R. 154)

sets forth this general theory.
One of the arguments made by appellant is that the court
erred in submitting the issue to the jury on the question of
merchantability and did not define what merchantability was.
In instruction No. 12 the court did define, in accordance
with the statute heretofore quoted, what goods to be merchantable
must be and stated:
"Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such
goods are used.11
The evidence clearly demonstrated and, plaintiff submits,
the appellant has conceded that the Condor Coach did not meet the
standard of merchantability.
The many defects that the witness Haslam outlined in his
testimony clearly reveal that the Condor Coach was not useable
for the ordinary purposes for which it was manufactured.

His

testimony is uncontradicted and while, in some instances, it is
disputed, no witness took the witness stand to deny that the
defects he encountered were not present.
Plaintiff submits that the jury could well have found that
a Condor Coach with a solenoid so close to the exhaust manifold
that it got hot and the heat caused it to malfunction, was not
reasonably fit for the purpose intended;

or that a Condor Coach

I

where the generator sucked air instead of fuel would not be
reasonably fit for the purpose;

or that a Condor Coach with a

fuel line to the generator put in so that it only picked up when
the gas tank was above half full would not be fit for the ordinary
purpose;

or that a Condor Coach with an engine mounted on the

chassis in such a manner as to unduly restrict the air supply;
or that a Condor Coach with a howl in the rear end indicating a
mismatch between the green gear and the pinion;

or a Condor Coach

with a drive line and differential too small to handle the motor
home was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which the Condor
Coach was manufactured.

In this instance we had a Condor Coach

with all of these defects in it.

It is respectfully submitted

that each defect the jury could have found rendered the Condor
Coach not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended.
One of the arguments made by the appellant was that it
should have been given an opportunity to make further repairs.
It will oe recalled that the Condor Coach had been in the hands
of appellant since June 10, 1970, practically two years, and the
various defects had not been remedied if, in fact, they could
have been remedied for a reasonable sum.

Certainly the air

supplied to the engine and differential would have been major
items that could not have been fixed without extensive remodeling
and repair work.
Our Utah law permits the buyer to have rescission or
keep the vehicle and claim the damages by comparison of value
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with price.

Under Utah law a buyer may not be required to keep

a defective vehicle, but may return it to the dealer and obtain
his money. Studebaker Bros. Co. of Utah v. Anderson, et al, 50
Utah 319, 167 Pac. 663, page 8, and Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor
Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 Pac. 196, page 8.

This shifts the

responsibility for placing the vehicle in a reasonable and useable
condition to the dealer where, it is respectfully submitted, it
should ultimately come to rest.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence supported
the submission of the plaintiff's claims to the jury, that the
instructions of the court were entirely consistent with the
evidence and were proper statements of the law as it applied to
plaintiff1s case.

It is further respectfully submitted that the

verdict was a fair, just and equitable disposition of the dispute,
that the parties had their day in court where their opportunity
to present any defensive matter was clearly protected.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the court should affirm
the jury verdict and the judgment of the trial court in plaintiff's
favor and against defendant Larson Ford Sales, Inc.

Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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